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INTRODUCTION:
The CAMPFIRE Programme
The CAMPFIRE programme is designed to decentralize the management of natural 
resources in the communal areas of Zimbabwe. Through the institution, inter alia, o f 
a new system of group rights, i.e. a common property regime, a participatory common 
property resource management system is being established for these areas. The 
guiding principle is that those individuals and ‘communities’ who bear the costs of 
resource management become the resource managers for their own direct benefit. 
The extent to which CAMPFIRE will be able to achieve these objectives depends on 
a variety of factors CAMPFIRE is developing a programme of “adaptive 
management” of natural resources, premised on the philosophy that monetary 
benefits produced from wildlife management and utilization will act as an incentive for 
local communities to develop appropriate institutional mechanisms to manage the 
wildlife resources in their own areas. In addition, CAMPFIRE operates on the basis 
of multifaceted involvement in the programme. At various levels, different actors are 
to be found ranging from the Government regulatory agencies, NGOs and research 
organizations to the “local” communities themselves.
In this paper, I examine some of the more salient effects and impacts of the 
participation of NGOs and aid agencies in the implementation of CAMPFIRE on the 
programme’s ability to institute a new system of rights in natural resources; and on 
the participation of local ‘communities’ in the management of these resources. In 
particular, I focus on the implications of monetary and other aid to the CAMPFIRE 
programme for the developing focus on economic benefits to the exclusion of other 
“benefits” of wildlife management.
This paper is largely based on my own field work in the -Prfiay Communal Lands 
(CLs) of the Nyaminyami District as well as documented case studies of other 
CAMPFIRE initiatives in communal Zimbabwe. Use is also made of field work 
material collected by other CASS researchers in various other field sites in which the 
CAMPFIRE programme is being implemented. I have also worked with, talked to and 
extensively interviewed various staff from the aid organizations participating in the 
programme, the Rural District Councils (RDCs) and other interested parties.
CAMPFIRE was envisaged in the Department of National Parks and Wild Life 
Management (DNPWLM) of the Ministry of Environment and Tourism (MET), 
[Zimbabwe] as a programme designed to enhance the participation of local 
communities in the management of their own natural resources. Although the 
programme originated as a holistic resource management programme for the CLs, its 
implementation has inevitably tended to focus exclusively on wildlife. Wildlife is seen 
as a resource that has the capacity for eliciting participation in management because 
it generates revenue for the communities through various forms of exploitation. Thus 
not only is wildlife stressed, but its commercial value is given prominence in the 
programme. This is hardly surprising, given that it was conceptualised by National
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P^rks and Wildlife. Thus all CLs1 participating in CAMPFIRE to date are not only 
those that have wildlife, but those that have commercially exploitable species and 
. quantities.
It was originally envisaged that CAMPFIRE would be implemented by an 
“Implementing Agency”, centrally located in the DNPWLM. However, Treasury never 
funded this agency and consequently implementation was undertaken by a local Non- 
Governmental Organization (NGO), the Zimbabwe Trust. A local NGO, the 
Zimbabwe Trust receives its funding from the British Overseas Development 
Association (ODA) and from the blocked funds of former Zimbabweans now living in 
the United Kingdom.
NGOs have come to play a significant role in funding CAMPFIRE programmes as 
well as in providing environmental and socio-economic implementation and 
monitoring/evaluation information. It is thus important to begin to understand the role 
of NGOs thus far and the impact that external aid is having on the programme and its 
implications for local participation in resource management. The DNPWLM 
recognises the need to evaluate the role of external aid in CAMPFIRE. The 
department does not, however, attribute any significant impact on the project to the 
participation of NGOs in its implementation.
“It is o f interest to note that very little, i f  any, o f the present progress is 
due to donor aid - it is mainly a result o f local effort. . . . I n  general, 
most viable projects do not require aid, and most non-viable projects 
should not receive aid. There are, however, certain limited areas in 
which aid could be o f use e.g. restocking o f game in depleted areas, 
electric game fencing to protect crops, vehicles and operational costs; 
for project staff". (DNPWLM, 1990: 5)
This paper will outline the roles played by four different NGOs in funding or otherwise 
aiding the implementation of CAMPFIRE, namely :
• Zimbabwe Trust (ZimTrust)
• United States Agency for international Development (USAID)
• CAMPFIRE Association (CA); and
• World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF).
I attempt to evaluate the effects of such aid on .the programme. Because of the 
diversity of contexts in which CAMPFIRE is being implemented, focus will be on two 
districts in the Zambezi valley: Nyaminyami and Guruve, and four districts in 
Matebeleland North and South: Binga, Tsholotsho, Bulilima-Mangwe and Hwange. 
Comparison with two communities that are evolving CAMPFIRE programmes with 
limited or no eternal aid - Mahenye Village in the Chipinge District and 
Chikwarakwara village in the Beitbridge District will be undertaken.
1 Zimbabwe consists of four land use and tenure categories: the large scale commercial farming 
sector; small scale commercial farming sector; communal lands and state land. The communal lands 
support about 60% of the total population of Zimbabwe and are currently in a state of ecological 
decline characterised by their structural inability to support existing livestock and human populations. 
For discussion of the reasons for this ecological degradation, see: Ranger, 1985.
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Other external agencies participating in CAMPFIRE implementation are not 
considered in this paper, although it should be borne in mind that their impacts on the 
programme are similarly fundamental and need to be considered for a more complete 
picture. The four agencies discussed here have been chosen either because they 
have had some financial input into this programme or because they have tended to 
have a role in defining the CAMPFIRE agenda for local communities and local 
authorities.
I will demonstrate that external aid tends to be concentrated in the high potential 
projects such as the Nyaminyami and Guruve DC projects, each with the potentia lof 
generating in excess of Z$1 million annually (about US$200,000), and to ignore the 
low potential areas. Moreover,: external aid tends to be distributed across whole 
districts or larger parts of the district, whereas the programmes of low potential areas 
tend to extend over very small geographic areas, typically villages.
I conclude that external aid has resulted in the development of sophisticated 
management structures, and has in turn provided these with the requisite operating 
capital in the high and medium potential areas. The effect of the development of 
such institutions, which typically become top-heavy bureaucracies, is to negate local 
participation in the management of the resource, a basic tenet o f the programme. 
Such bureaucratic structures are unlikely to be sustainable after the funding ceases.
However, while such local institutions negate the potential for local people’s 
participation in resource management and institutional development, they result in 
increased capacity for the local authorities to manage the resource. Thus typically 
DCs’ capacity to manage wildlife, carry out Problem Animal Control (PAC) and other 
crop protection measures, and to enter into joint venture arrangements with private 
enterprise is enhanced as a result of their employing skilled labour and acquiring the 
necessary capital. This technical management capacity actually increases wildlife 
revenues earned by DCs. However, because of the high costs of maintaining these 
structures, revenue distributed as dividends to the so-called ‘producer communitit 
is therefore reduced. Moreover, while technical capacity increases, ward inputs into 
the management programme remain marginal, ‘indicating that the desired degree of 
sub-district devolution of proprietorship has not yet taken place’ (Murphree, 1992: 3), 
or might never take place in the current context.
On the other hand, the low potential, and to some extent medium potential 
programmes, tend to be dominated by the local authorities (DCs) because of 
historical factors as well as the absence of any countervailing influences on the DCs’ 
paternalistic tendencies. DC dominance results from the historical configuration of 
local government in Zimbabwe which discounted participatory mechanisms and 
institutions in favour of less democratic, paternalistic structures. The colonial 
philosophy of local government has generally continued unchanged into post colonial 
era (vide e.g. Drinkwater, 1991), and the implementation of CAMPFIRE is but one 
manifestation of this continuity (Murombedzi, 1992).
Secondly, I conclude that external aid agencies typically get into conflict with the local 
authorities of the areas in which they fund projects over issues of accountability and 
control of the decision-making processes and machinery. Another field of contest is 
between aid agencies and local people. Aid agencies view local people’s demands 
on them as constituting ‘shopping lists’ which are not viable: while local people see
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the role of these agencies as that of responding their demands without questioning 
them. Again this arises because the agencies are not accountable to local people or 
their representatives.
Finally, I conclude that participation tends to be defined by dynamics external to local 
communities in both situations where there is external aid and those in which there is 
none. This is because external aid tends to inhibit participation by developing capital 
intensive, top-heavy bureaucracies; while the absence of external aid implies the 
absence of checks on the DCs, and hence results in DCs becoming more 
paternalistic in their relationships with local communities. In such situations, DCs 
tend to define for local communities the types of benefit they can get from wildlife 
management as well as determine the investment decisions of these communities. 
Thus, in both scenarios (aid and no external aid), the need to define and institute 
local management of the resources remains urgent. The need for greater local 
control and the evolution of truly co-management arrangements in which local 
decision-making is given prominence is indicated.
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ZIMBABWE TRUST:
The Role of the Implementing Agency in CAMPFIRE
The CAMPFIRE programme was first implemented in November, 1988, when the first 
two district councils, Nyaminyami and Guruve, were granted Appropriate Authority 
status by the Department of National Parks and Wild Life Management. Appropriate 
Authority (AA), granted under a 1982 amendment to the National Parks and Wildlife 
Act (1975), entails that district councils manage the wildlife resources of their 
constituent areas for the direct benefit o f their populations. DCs also have certain 
obligations. From these obligations (as loosely defined in AA) CAMPFIRE has 
developed several principles which inform its approach. These are summarised 
below:
• Effective management of wildlife is best achieved by giving it focused value for 
those'who live with it.
• Differential inputs must result in differential benefits.
• There must be a positive correlation between quality of management and 
magnitude of benefit.
• The unit of proprietorship should be the unit of production, management and 
benefit.
• The unit of proprietorship should be as small as practicable within ecological and 
socio-political constraints. (Murphree, 1992: 17-19).
ZimTrust as the principal implementing agency sees its role as strengthening the 
management capacity of ‘producer communities’ and their institutions to manage their 
own resources, as well as DCs capacity to manage the resources of their constituent 
areas. This is achieved through the provision of grants to district councils for 
infrastructural and capital development. ZimTrust also funds district councils in their 
local institutional development programmes through the provision of training grants 
as well as recruitment and funding of district level “Institutions'Officers”.
The Nyaminyami and Guruve DCs’ CAMPFIRE programmies are funded by the 
Zimbabwe Trust. In Nyaminyami, Zimbabwe Trust acts as a donor agency to the 
Nyaminyami Wildlife Management Trust (NWMT), a sub-committee of the district 
council formed as the management arm for wildlife resources. NWMT was itself the 
culmination of two years of preparatory work by a “Steering Committee to Establish 
the NWMT ...”2 The steering committee’s membership was drawn from the NDC; the 
District Administrator’s office; NGOs operating in the district (Save the Children Fund 
(UK) Zimbabwe, and Omay Development Trust); Bumi Commercial Fishing 
Association; Safari Operators, Nyaminyami; the Bumi Hills Safari Lodge and two 
anthropologists carrying out research in the Omay CL.
Thus the steering committee was made up of representatives of central government, 
NGOs, commercial operators with interests in the district’s resources, and 
representatives of the local communities, i.e. the Nyaminyami District Council (NDC). 
The extent to which local interests would have prevailed given this array of interest 
groups is obviously debatable. It is, however, instructive to note that the two
2 The Wildlife of Nyaminyami, Nyaminyami District Council, 1987.
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anthropologists both resigned from the steering committee on the grounds that it did 
not give sufficient scope for the participation of local people in the development of a 
wildlife management programme for the district.3 It is also instructive to note that the 
Field Operations manager of Save the Children Fund (UK) Zimbabwe, who served as 
a member of the steering committee, was to join ZimTrust and become the first 
general manager of the NWMT.
As a donor to NWMT, ZimTrust has provided technical and financial assistance. The 
technical assistance consists of planning and management advice (ZimTrust Project 
Manager); procurement and administrative services (ZimTrust Finance Manager) and 
staff management training at ward and village level (ZimTrust Institutional 
Development Unit). (Zimbabwe Trust, 1991: 5)
In 1989 the extent of the ZimTrust grant to Nyaminyami District Council (NDC) was 
Z$171,000 as well as the services of the interim general manager. This reflected a 
subsidy by ZimTrust to NWMT which freed revenues to pay the producer 
communities dividends during this first year of operation. Without this subsidy 
NWMT would have experienced a net deficit and been unable to distribute any 
dividends to the wards. This would certainly have constituted a serious problem for 
further implementation of the programme, particularly in Omay communal lands
ZimTrust has also funded the Capital and Manpower Development Programme of the 
NWMT. This funding has resulted in the creation of a top-heavy administration that 
has proved difficult to sustain and resulted in an increased recurrent expenditure and 
reduced ward dividends (Zimbabwe Trust, 1990; Murombedzi, 1992; Murphree, 
1992). While this top-heavy, capital intensive management structure has certainly 
improved the DC’s technical ability to manage the resource, it has actually detracted 
from the satisfaction of all of the CAMPFIRE principles.
The participation o f local people in the NWMT wildlife management programme has 
been limited from the outset by the need to establish a technical cadre of highly 
skilled people to manage the resource. This need was perceived by the implementing 
agency who funded and seconded one of their senior management staff as interim 
general manager of NWMT to ‘identify the management options’ 4 open to NWMT 
and develop a management programme and a structure to implement that 
programme. The resultant management structure is probably a reflection of the 
implementing agency’s need to create a local body through which it could implement 
the programme as perceived by the agency rather than by the local authority or 
communities.
The assumption was that the-N W M T would be controlled by its board of 
management, essentially composed of representatives of the people (Ward 
Councillors), and that participation in management decision-making would, therefore, 
be guaranteed. However, membership of the board of management also includes 
NGOs, including Zimbabwe Trust, and typically the decisions of the board are 
influenced by the funding agency. The board has actually become dependent on 
ZimTrust funding for its functioning arid councillors typically expect ZimTrust to ‘fund’ 
them out of all their problems. I have observed councillors at different board
3 C. Cousins and P. Reynolds, personaI communication.
4 Simon Metcalfe (NWMT interim General Manager), personal communication.
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meetings in Nyaminyami actually having to be cautioned by the district executive not 
to become dependent on ZimTrust for their resource management problems but to 
attempt to make the resource pay for itself.
ZimTrust assistance has also resulted in conflict between the agency and the district 
council executive. The executive is a paternalistic cadre of experts in local 
government administration whose training and experience are such as to discount 
the ability of local people to plan and administer their own affairs, let alone manage 
their resources in a sustainable manner. Besides, the District Councils Act (1980) 
and the Communal Lands Act (1982), whose administration they are tasked with, are 
bureaucratic pieces of legislation that do not specify the need for much local 
participation irv decision making beyond the confines of the elected district councils. 
Moreover, the executive is accountable to the Ministry of Local Government, Rural 
and Urban Development (MLGRUD), rather than to local communities for their 
decisions.
Further, the Legal and Administrative context in which Appropriate Authority is 
granted is not clear (Murphree, 1992). AA is granted to the DC on the assumption 
that it will further devolve the management responsibility to sub-district levels. 
However, below the DC the only other ‘formal’ organizations that exist are the Ward 
Development Committees (WADCOs) and the Village Development Committees 
(VIDCOs). Created in 1984 by a Prime Minister’s directive and not by an act of 
Parliament, these bodies do not have any legal status. As such* DCs are not legally 
bound to devolve authority over resources to non-legal entities. Moreover, AA is 
granted in terms of the Parks and Wild Life Act (1975) rather than either the 
Communal Lands Act (1982) or the District Councils Act (1981) which govern the 
functions of the DCs. Hence, DC executive staff are forced to interpret.appropriate 
authority in terms of all the Acts that impinge on their functions, and there has been 
no attempt to rationalise this legislative context. In such a situation, the NDC has 
tended to fall back on the provisions of the District Councils Act rather than attempt 
some innovation which might fail and for which they would be accountable to head 
office.
ZirnTrust implementation of the programme tended to circumvent the MLGRUD by 
negotiating directly with the local authorities. While this had the immense advantage 
of avoiding bureaucratic inertia, it has meant that MLGRUD has not come out clearly 
in support of CAMPFIRE and has not produced any clear cut guidelines for local 
authorities on the programme, thus creating an atmosphere of uncertainty at the local 
authority level.
ZimTrust, on the other hand, has insisted that NDC devolve control over resources to 
the sub-district levels, i.e. the wards and villages, because these constitute the 
‘producer communities’. ZimTrust has been able to put this condition on the 
utilization of their funds and because NWMT need the funds to stay in business, they 
are forced to accept the condition.
However, NDC see such demands as compromising their authority over the district 
and its resources. Their resentment of ZimTrust is most dearly exemplified by their 
asking ZimTrust to withdraw the services of their interim general manager after only a 
year, and their subsequent recruitment of a wildlife manager who is more
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accountable to NDC.5 The total ZimTrust,grant to NDC between 1989 and 1991 was 
Z$883,621-97. (Current exchange rate (August 1996): US$1 = Z$5).
On the other hand, in Guruve, ZimTrust has funded the implementation of a Council 
run safari operation for three years (1989-1991) by providing basic safari equipment 
worth Z$26,279-02 and paying half the Professional Hunter’s salary (the other half 
being paid from wildlife revenues) as well as financing the operation costs o f an 
'Institutions and Training Development Officer1. ZimTrust also purchased four pick­
up trucks and a lorry to facilitate the safari operation as well as the PAC programme. 
Not nearly as much capital has been invested in Guruve as in Nyaminyami and the 
impact of the external aid on the programme has been decidedly different.
Because of the nature of ZimTrust funding in Guruve, technical wildlife management 
capacity in the DC is poorly developed. Unlike Nyaminyami, where local people’s 
participation is Ijmited by the highly skilled nature of the management structure, local 
participation in Guruve is limited, probably, by the DCs paternalism. As a result of 
this perceived paternalism, there is significant conflict between ZimTrust and the 
district council. As in Nyaminyami, the executive feels that ZimTrust aid is essentially 
undermining council authority in the district. In Guruve, the District Administrator has 
alleged that local communities are being influenced by ‘external agencies’, namely 
ZimTrust (Thomas, 1992), to make undesirable decisions that are contrary to 
executive decisions. Thomas observes that “Enabling local communities to be the 
decision-makers in Guruve district seems to be directly contrary , to the council's 
executive’s wishes which suggest a continuing paternalism”.
In both Nyaminyami and Guruve, the ZimTrust Institutional Development Unit (IDU) 
has been responsible for the establishment of an institutional development 
programme that is designed to develop appropriate local level institutions to facilitate 
local participation in the management of the resource and to develop an appropriate 
system of rights in wildlife. The IDU model has been one of creating Ward Wildlife 
Committees (WWCs) with expectations that these will eventually lead to the creation 
of Village Wildlife Committees.
The WWCs are typically ejected by universal suffrage, with all adult members o f the 
ward present at the election meeting participating. They are ‘typical’ western 
committees composed of a Chair, Vice Chairperson, Secretary, Treasurer and 
Committee members. The WWC is expected to hold regular ‘properly constituted’ 
meetings, i.e. with an agenda, minutes and a quorum. This is obviously an imported 
cultural model whose appropriateness for wildlife management scenario has never 
beeri questioned. Given the experimental nature of the programme and the need for 
flexibility, it is possible that a model of participatory democracy in which the mandate 
to whatever authority structure is created is flexible is more desirable than the 
imposed model of electoral democracy. That possibility does not seem to have been 
considered by the implementing agency.
Zimbabwe Trust, besides providing this extension service through its IDU, also 
assists DCs to recruit and train Institutions Officers. These officers’ budgets for
5 Zimbabwe Trust funded an interim genera! manager (seconded from ZimTrust) between 1988 and 
October 1990, when his services were withdrawn by NDC following fundamental disagreements over 
the utilization of grant aid and over the need to devolve control to the sub-district levels.
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institutional development work within their respective districts are typically funded by 
ZimTrust, which also provides vehicles and sometimes pays their salaries. Thus in 
this context, it is quite likely that the implementing agency is here creating a 
constituency through which it can function at the local level. Thus rather than being 
instruments for local participation, the WWCs seem to be instruments for the 
implementation of ZimTrust wildlife management ideas at the local level.
The extent to which WWCs will be the basis for the development of a system of 
group rights in wildlife is also questionable. The iDU, besides creating these 
organizations, has also been involved in producing the model by-laws to guide their 
operations. These by-laws are not the result o f any significant participatory process 
and do not reflect local intentions and aspirations regarding wildlife management. 
Rather, they reflect the implementing agency’s concerns with the problem. This is 
most clearly exemplified by the fact that the by-laws actually create favourable 
conditions for the operation of safaris, but nowhere do they attempt to define any 
wildlife use rights for the local communities. Thus local utilization of wildlife is not 
part of the new system of rights in the resource as envisaged by the IDU.
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THE ROLE OF A BILATERAL AID AGENCY IN CAMPFIRE:
The United States Agency for International Development (USAID)
Although Zimbabwe Trust is also the implementing agency for CAMPFIRE 
programmes in Matebeleland, the funds for programme implementation in these 
provinces is from USAID. Thus the mechanics are somewhat different and ZimTrust 
has less autonomy in implementing the programme. Again this has different 
implications for the evolution of the programme in this region.
The USAID is a bilateral government agency which funds development 
projects/programmes through local (indigenous) NGOs. A condition of the funding is 
that there must be some relationship with the government of the recipient country, 
and hence the indigenous NGO must be licensed in the country of operation. 
Working through NGOs is designed to promote and facilitate the decentralized 
administration of projects and programmes, which would not be possible with 
governments. The USAID CAMPFIRE funding is essentially a grant to the Ministry of 
Environment and Tourism’s (MET) Department of National Parks and Wild Life 
Management. ZimTrust is the primary implementer of the programme, th e  USAID 
grant to MET, ZimTrust and CASS amounts to US$8,141,000 for a five year period. 
The grant to ZimTrust is US$1,541,000 for programme implementation. ZimTrust is 
also responsible for receipt and control of US$1,400,000 for district level 
infrastructural and capital requirements (Zimbabwe Trust, 1990: 10).
The USAID objective in participating in CAMPFIRE is two fold: first to develop 
communities and their capacities to manage their own natural resources; and 
secondly to develop local organizations such as ZimTrust as a way of promoting 
decentralization and community participation in development administration and 
planning. Thus, in the programme, USAID works with local authorities through 
ZimTrust to whom USAID grants are made. ZimTrust in turn makes sub-grants to 
District Councils who are the Appropriate Authorities for their areas.
The grant to DNPWLM is intended for wildlife conservation on Parks estate rather 
than on Communal land. The grant to local authorities is designed to stimulate the 
economic development of the participating communities. It is not aimed at producing 
handouts which the communities have not participated in producing. Hence, USAID 
evaluates the programme on the basis of achievements in community participation 
and the possibility of the programme continuing after the grant period. In this 
connection, USAID recognizes that there is a danger of CAMPFIRE becoming a 
welfare programme that only produces wildlife dividends for communities without 
instituting any viable mechanisms of community participation in decision making and 
resource management. As such, USAID sees the need for some local utilization of 
the resource, such as traditional hunting, aiid is actively seeking ways of encouraging 
the development of such local utilization. However, because utilization of wildlife 
resources has tended to be based on safari hunting, with local authorities’ role limited 
to protecting the safari interest (Murombedzi, 1992), USAID does not see itself as 
promoting the safari interest. Rather, they see their role as that of promoting the 
business interest. This is justified on the basis that the nature of the resource is such
6 i his section is largely based on an interview with Dr. C.R. Cutshall, Project Co-ordinator, USAID 
Natural Resources Management Project, 18th February, 1992.
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that it can only be profitably managed by professional safari operators; that is, safari 
hunting is a highly specialized and personalized business and the need for personal 
contacts etc. cannot be met by local authorities.
USAID concedes, however, that the AID rules and conditions on grant funding are 
unnecessarily rigid and may not be appropriate for programmes of an experimental 
nature such as CAMPFIRE which demand flexibility, especially in the ability o f field 
staff to quickly respond to varying local circumstances. Moreover, the very success 
of CAMPFIRE programmes is predicated on their ability to mutate to suit a dynamic 
local environment; otherwise, as a learning process, rigidity is a sure recipe for 
disaster.
The AID grant has also created conflicts between local communities and local 
authorities, as well as between USAID and the implementing agency. These conflicts 
are clearly illustrated in what has come to be referred to as the Hawkes/Madzudzo 
Report (1991) by researchers from the monitoring agency in the programme - CASS. 
The report points out contradictions between the project emphasis on large mammals 
(felephants) and community needs for different provisions (water projects) and the 
need for holistic resource management. The report further deals with the 
contradiction between the need for community participation and the forced relocation 
of some households from Korodziba and Soroboni communities in Tsholotsho. 
Hawkes and Madzudzo point to the problems of developing viable local institutions 
because of the differences in perceptions of the resource management problem 
between local authorities and the funding and implementing agencies on the one 
hand, and the local communities on the other.
Publication of the report caused a furore in the funding agency USAID. This 
culminated in a seminar attended by representatives of all local authorities 
participating in the USAID Natural Resources Management (NRM) programme, 
USAID, the implementing agency - ZimTrust, CASS, and the DNPWLM. It is 
significant to note that there were no representatives of local communities at this 
seminar. The purpose of the seminar was to discuss and respond to the charges 
made against the programme by the Hawkes/Madzudzo report.
The question of modifying programme implementation to take account of the 
shortcomings identified was never considered by the participants. Instead, the 
seminar generally questioned the methodology of the CASS researchers and 
concluded that their findings were anecdotal rather than ‘scientific’. The report was 
based on observations made in the field by the research team as well as their 
discussion with various members o f the affected communities over a period of about 
six weeks. The research team had also during this time been administering a 
baseline socio-economic questionnaire to a sample of the households in these 
communities. However, the data generated in this survey was yet to be analyzed at 
the time the report in question was produced; and it was this absence of statistical 
data that was deemed to constitute an ‘unscientific’ report by the Aid community! As 
such, it was felt that the report’s criticism of the project implementation was 
unjustified and that no action would, therefore, be taken to correct the problem of the 
project as apparently perceived by the supposed beneficiaries.
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PRODUCING THE ‘ENVIRONMENTAL AUDIT:
The Role Of The World Wide Fund For Nature In CAMPFIRE
The WWF Multispecies Unit is involved in the monitoring of the wildlife resources in 
the Communal areas and in setting up annual off-take quotas for safari hunting and 
PAC. WWF also makes recommendations on the sustainability of various other 
resource utilization strategies, particularly non-consumptive safaris and cropping 
quotas. The resource monitoring and quota setting activities produce an 
‘environmental audit’ that reflects the nature of the resource at a particular time and 
could also be used to measure the effectiveness of a management programme. 
However, WWF operates without any participation from the local populations and 
produces the quotas and reports for district councils to aid them in their planning and 
administration of safari hunting agreements.
Moreover, the setting of quotas for safari off-take reflects the importance of the 
nature of resource exploitation which is aimed at producing a dividend. It is thus a 
sensitive indicator of the commercial worth of the resource as produced by the high 
cost/high benefit safari operations. They do not, however, provide any signals of the 
values placed by people on the resource (Myers, 1990). There exists an asymmetry 
of evaluation between local communities and the ‘official evaluators’, WWF. Hence, 
there is a need to analyze and estimate the non-commercial outputs of wildlife and 
the values placed on these by local communities.
Quotas reflect district wide potential for a specific user groyp, the safari operators, 
and are not tied to the needs or activities of any specific proprietorial group or 
‘community’ that constitutes the putative CAMPFIRE management unit. Hence the 
quota is not tied to any group of managers. There is neither participation by the local 
communities in the monitoring of the state of ‘their wildlife resources’ nor in the 
production of such crucial information. This points to the absence of any local 
resource management system and the fact that the CAMPFIRE programme has 
resulted in the ‘recentralization’ of management at the local authority level rather than 
decentralization to the community level. Moreover, emphasis on the production of 
benefits by ‘external’ interest groups has meant that the CAMPFIRE programme has 
tended to restrict local people’s rights in wildlife to rights to the ‘benefits' of wildlife 
utilization rather than rights in the resource itself.
Furthermore, because the ‘environmental audit’ produced by WWF is aimed at 
identifying a ‘sustainable rate of off-take’ for the safari industry and other forms of 
utilization which exclude local communities, CAMPFIRE has evolved into a 
programme that strengthens the private users of the resource while restricting the 
subversive capacity of local communities to resist this alienation by placing upon 
them the burden of monitoring each other’s behaviour in return for a dividend. 
Continued, and sometimes increasing, ‘poaching’ in some communities with 
CAMPFIRE programmes could certainly be an indication of this fundamental 
contradiction. Thus CAMPFIRE does not necessarily imply the evolution of a new 
system of rights for local communities in their wildlife resources since it makes no 
provision for local control over wildlife utilization decisions. Rather, it evolves into a 
programme that limits local participation for the benefit of external interest.
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IMPLEMENTING CAMPFIRE WITHOUT THE AID OF AID AGENCIES:
The Case of Mahenye And Chikwarakwara Villages
In Mahenye and Chikwarakwara villages, CAMPFIRE has tended to evolve as a 
result of local effort, with the participation of a Safari Operator with a concession to 
operate in the area, and with the DNPWLM’s CAMPFIRE Co-ordinator acting as the 
‘implementing agency’. The only difference in this model is that no external funding 
was injected to get the project off the ground. As a result, communities are able to 
distribute the bulk of their wildlife revenues either as individual or household 
dividends, less management levies paid to the DC. However, in this model the 
District Council still manages the resource to the extent that it is the legal entity to 
which appropriate authority is granted. The DC thus manages the concessions, 
collects the concession and trophy fees, and ultimately disburses the revenues thus 
generated to the villages concerned.
Typically, communities are asked by the DC to identify projects or programmes in 
which they would want to . invest their wildlife revenues before the revenues are 
released to them. This implies some residual DC control over community decision 
making. Although this is denied in Child and Peterson (1991), my own observations 
in Chikwarakwara in 1992 indicate that community participation has not occurred in 
decision making regarding the distribution and utilization of wildlife revenues. In this 
case, the village Development Committee refused (on behalf of their constituents, 
most of whom were present at the meeting) to accept their wildlife dividend for 1991 
because they felt that district council wanted to impose their own decisions on them.
According to Child and Peterson (1991), the distribution of household dividends and 
the allocation of some of the wildlife revenue to a community project,in 1991 
represented the apex of participatory decision-making. The decision also represented 
movement towards the establishment of a common property regime (and therefore a 
system of rights) in wildlife by this village. A  year later, when I visited the community 
to attend a ceremony to distribute wildlife revenues, it became evident during the 
meeting that there was conflict between the community and the local authority over 
control of the revenue and rights in wildlife.
The village had decided to invest their dividend of Z$19,000 in a grocery store (the 
main motivation being to sell seed and other agricultural inputs at the store) and to 
request council for a loan to purchase a truck to ferry stock to the store. The 1992 
wildlife dividend was offered as collateral for the loan. However, council executive 
refused to grant the loan on the basis that council was not a funding agency (another 
reflection of the legal problems of appropriate authority), and the Senior Executive 
Officer intimated that, in the council executive’s view, the project was not viable. 
This intimation was resented by the village who saw it as an attempt to impose a 
project on them. They refused to consider other projects and indicated that the 
executive could as well keep the dividend as the wildlife did not belong to the village 
anyway.
At a wildlife revenue distribution ceremony in Mahenye village, Chipinge district, all 
the distribution decisions appear to have been made by the CAMPFIRE Co-ordinator 
who then held meetings with members of the wildlife committee to explain how the 
funds were to be distributed. The co-ordinator then produced visual aids for these
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community members to use to explain to the community how the revenue was being 
distributed. No explanation was given as to why these distribution decisions were 
being made and by whom. Throughout the explanation process, the co-ordinator 
stood by the wildlife committee members ready to offer assistance.
Thus there is evidence from both Mahenye and Chikwarakwara that this model does 
not necessarily account for enhanced local participation in management and decision 
making. The villages are appropriate distribution communities for wildlife revenues 
but there is no evidence to suggest participation in either the management or 
distribution decisions. These are controlled by the DC in conjunction with the 
CAMPFIRE Co-ordinator of the DNPWLM who, in effect, constitute the implementing 
agency.
It would appear that the legal framework which devolves authority to the district level 
but not to the sub-district levels remains the major obstacle in this latter context and 
that solutions should be sought urgently. District Councils also seem to constitute an 
obstacle to local participation to the extent that they remain paternalistic. As such 
management of the resource should be based on some clearer co-management 
arrangement in which local communities have greater decision-making authority.
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OBFUSCATING ACCOUNTABILITY?
The Creation Of The CAMPFIRE Association
The CAMPFIRE Association (CA) came into being as the lobby group of district 
councils with appropriate authority. However, motivation for the formation of the CA 
came from ZimTrust rather than from the district councils themselves. Moreover, the 
initial funding for the CAMPFIRE Association was from ZimTrust. The CAMPFIRE 
Association charges district councils a levy of 1.5% of their gross wildlife revenues as 
an annual fee for the services they provide throughout the year. However, the 
Association is still developing its own agenda and as such it is still not clear what 
member councils will benefit from such membership.
However, the CA requires member councils to submit annual reports and income 
expense accounts to them. It is thus introducing a system whereby district councils 
will be accountable to the Association, rather than to its own constituency, for the 
wildlife management programme. The problems of this are obvious, and coupled 
with the problems of accountability to central government already being experienced 
by local authorities, the implications for local participation are grave.
The CA is an association of district councils, not local communities or ‘producer 
communities’. This is because district councils are the appropriate authorities for 
wildlife, and perhaps also because it is easier for aid agencies to deal with clearly 
defined organizations than with a proliferation of diverse and stratified ‘communities’. 
However, district councils become accountable to the CA which is itself still 
accountable to ZimTrust because of the seed money. When the CA becomes self 
sufficient (with levies paid by the district councils), it is not clear that any mechanisms 
exist to. make it accountable to the district councils, much less to local communities. 
Thus the extent to which the CA is an instrument for local participation in decision­
making is questionable. As a lobby group, it would appear that the Association thus 
far is acting to reinforce the interests of the safari industry, rather than local 
communities, in the wildlife resources of the communal lands.
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CONCLUSIONS:
External Aid And Its Implications For The Development Of A Common Property 
Regime In Wildlife
External aid seems to have negative implications for the ability o f CAMPFIRE to 
facilitate local participation in decision-making. Albeit the absence of aid is not 
necessarily a solution, as evidenced by the experiences of the villages where there 
has been no external aid, there is an urgent need to closely examine external aid and 
attempt to mitigate its negative impacts on local participation.
Aid agencies tend to come into conflict with both local authorities and local 
communities. This is because aid, especially funding, tends to be tied to the need to 
maintain CAMPFIRE principles,, particularly the need to devolve control over 
decision-making to local communities. The aid agencies consider themselves, and 
come to be seen as, the watchdogs over these principles. However, aid agencies 
are themselves not accountable to either local authorities or communities for their 
actions. Because they are not involved in the decision-making process within the aid 
agencies, both local authorities and local communities tend to then demand funding 
or other aid without any strings attached. This has not been forthcoming. Typically, 
aid agencies determine what is to be funded or done, and how; with very little, if any, 
local input.
Local authorities, on the other hand, see aid agencies as undermining their authority 
over constituencies and their control over resource utilization, particularly revenue 
allocation decisions. Moreover, they see aid agencies’ insistence on the observance 
of sometimes ambiguous CAMPFIRE principles as a demand that they become 
accountable to these agencies. The local authorities, on their part, demand that aid 
agencies become more accountable to them for their activities since it is their 
responsibility to plan and administer ‘development’ in their constituent areas. Again 
this conflict has the impact of limiting the possibilities of the local people participating 
in the programme.
Aid agencies tend to complicate the already complex issue of accountability for 
resource management. Because of the need to keep track of their money, they tend 
to require that local authorities become accountable to them, if only in the limited 
context of the CAMPFIRE programme, for the implementation of a local management 
regime. This already defeats the objective of constituting a new property regime in 
which local people participate in the decision-making process.
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